This paper simulates the cash flows and balance sheets of the Bank of Japan (BoJ) before and after the end of Quantitative and Qualitative Monetary Easing (QQE) under various scenarios. The simulations show that the BoJ will record significant accounting losses after the end of QQE, because the yields on Japanese government bonds (JGBs) acquired during QQE will be lower than the interest rate on excess reserves due to the normalization of the short-term interest rate after the end of QQE. These losses are fiscal costs for the consolidated Japanese government, as they correspond to increased interest expenses to the public. The extent of the BoJ's accounting losses depends crucially on the duration of QQE and the interest-rate elasticity of banknote demand.
Introduction
The Bank of Japan (BoJ) commenced its "Quantitative and Qualitative Monetary Easing" (QQE) policy in April 2013. The purpose of this policy was to achieve a two percent annual CPI inflation rate at the earliest possible time, with a time horizon of about two years.
Through this policy, the BoJ has more than doubled the monetary base and the holdings of Japanese government bonds (JGBs). 1 The BoJ has also doubled the average remaining maturity of newly purchased JGBs. As a result, the size of the BoJ's balance sheet relative to GDP has become far larger than those in the US and the euro area, as shown in Figure   1 . Figure 2 summarizes the composition of the BoJ's assets between 1998 and 2015.
QQE remains ongoing. In April 2015, two years after the onset of QQE, the BoJ announced that it expected to achieve the two percent annual inflation target in the first half of fiscal year 2016; thus it could not achieve the inflation target as initially planned. In April 2016, the BoJ revised the expected time of the achievement of the inflation target to fiscal year 2017.
While QQE continues, the BoJ has not made any announcement on a QQE exit strategy yet. For example, at the Standing Committee on Audit in the Upper House of the National Diet of Japan in June 2015, BoJ Governor Haruhiko Kuroda said that it was too early to discuss an exit strategy as the appropriate strategy would depend on economic and financial market conditions at the time of exit.
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Nevertheless, it is important to discuss the BoJ's exit strategy before exit because of a possibility that the BoJ will report significant accounting losses after the end of QQE. If the BoJ raises the policy interest rate after the achievement of the inflation target, it may then incur a capital loss associated with the decline in the market price of its long-term bond holdings, as suggested by Goodfriend (2000) and simulated by Fujiki, Okina, and Shiratsuka 1 The monetary base increased from 138 trillion yen at the end of 2012 to 380 trillion yen as of June 2016. Over the same period, its JGB holdings increased from 89 trillion yen to 373 trillion yen. 2 There is a dissenting BOJ Policy Board member who is expressing his view on the possible effects of QQE on the BOJ's profit and balance sheet in the course of exiting QQE in the future (See Kiuchi 2015) . (2001) . While the BoJ has adopted an amortized cost method for its accounting since 2004, so that a mark-to-market capital loss will not appear on its balance sheet if it holds longterm assets until maturity, it will still need to maintain central-bank current account balances held by banks (i.e., reserve balances) at a high level for an extended period of time in such a case. In this case, the BoJ will need to pay interest on excess reserves to control the policy rate. It is possible that the interest expenses on excess reserves exceed the interest revenues from asset holdings, causing the BoJ to run accounting losses. The BoJ's payments to the Japanese government will then be zero, or even negative if it receives government subsidies to cover any part of the losses.
In theory, the central bank is part of the consolidated government, so its accounting loss per se should not matter as long as the government and the central bank arrange a losssharing rule in advance. Such a rule, however, is not envisioned by the law governing the Bank of Japan, the Bank of Japan Act, currently. Also, Ueda (2003) , a then Policy Board member at the BoJ, pointed out that if the government could be committed to a loss-sharing rule with the central bank without a significant problem, then central-bank independence would not be an issue in the first place. He raised a concern that if the central bank runs negative equity, then the government may intervene in the central bank's monetary policy through capital injection. Indeed, the current level of fiscal debt in Japan is very high.
3 Some argue that there is a concern that fiscal policy will dominate monetary policy to maintain a low interest rate on government fiscal debt (Ikeo 2013; Okina 2015) .
In the US, several existing studies examine the Federal Reserve's balance sheet, which was expanded due to the Large- Also, other studies consider the effect of the Federal Reserve's net assets on price stability.
For example, Del Negro and Sims (2014) argue that the central bank cannot guarantee price stability if the government is not committed to sharing losses with the central bank, because the central bank may tolerate a high inflation rate to earn seigniorage. They show that this possibility leads to multiple equilibria because of self-fulfilling public expectations. Likewise, Reis (2015) classifies three types of central bank insolvency (negative current profit; violation of the rule for the distribution of current profit; and intertemporal insolvency). Reis argues that the inflation rate will depend on the type of insolvency applied to the central bank, as the central bank will adjust seigniorage to achieve the given condition for its solvency.
Regarding a loss-sharing rule between the central bank and the government, Goodfriend (2014) has proposed that the Federal Reserve should retain its profit before the exit from QE to build a loss-absorbing capital buffer for post-exit losses.
In this paper, we simulate the transition of the (2014) shows that the BoJ will report accounting losses after the end of QQE, even without the expansion of the BOJ's asset purchase program in October 2014. The contribution of our analysis to the literature is to incorporate subsequent policy changes by the BoJ and also to simulate the transition of the BoJ's balance sheet under various scenarios to identify key determinants of its losses after the end of QQE. We find that a longer duration of QQE and a higher interest-rate elasticity of banknote demand will increase the BoJ's accounting losses significantly. Thus, the BoJ should allow for an increased cost when extending the duration of QQE, and should not take the current banknote demand, about 19% of nominal GDP in June 2016, for granted. Furthermore, we find that if the BoJ does not cease, but instead tapers its asset purchase program in the exit from QQE, its accounting losses will decrease as it will earn profit through the term spread. This effect is significantly stronger if there is no safety channel, i.e., the effect of the bond supply on the long-term interest rate.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 models the BoJ's balance sheet. Section 3 sets up the simulation, including the description of data and the calibration of parameters. We report the results of the benchmark simulation in Section 4 and conduct a sensitivity analysis in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Model of the Bank of Japan's Accounts
We consider a simple model of the BoJ's balance sheet, consisting of the following items:
JGBs
Reserve balances held by financial institutions Other assets Reserve balances held by the government Banknotes Other liabilities Net assets
Here, reserve balances are current account balances at the BoJ. Other assets and liabilities comprise various items, including Treasury bills (T-bills), commercial paper and bonds, exchange-traded funds (ETFs), loans and bills discounted, foreign currency assets, and repos.
To focus on the effect of large-scale purchases of JGBs on the BoJ's balance sheet, we simplify the balance sheet by defining the difference between other assets and liabilities as "net short-term assets". This approach ignores the presence of long-term assets other than JGBs, such as ETFs, real estate investment funds (REITs), and stocks, which are included in "Other assets" on the BoJ's balance sheet. As of March 31, 2016, the total book value of these items is 9.3 trillion yen while the BoJ's JGB holdings sum to 269 trillion yen. If a significant capital gain arises for these assets, then the BoJ's cumulative accounting profit over time may increase up to a few trillion yen in total. As shown below, this figure is small compared to the simulated change in the BoJ's cumulative accounting profit. Thus, our simplifying assumption does not affect the main results of the model described below.
In addition, in the model, we ignore the reserve balances held by the government. For most of the 2000s, the government's reserve balances are between one and three percent of those held by financial institutions at the end of each fiscal year. Thus, ignoring these balances also does not significantly affect the results of the model. 4 Accordingly, we consider the following simplified BoJ's balance sheet:
Reserve balances held by financial institutions (D t ) Net short-term assets (S t ) Banknotes (C t ) Net assets (E t )
The notations of variables are in parentheses. The subscript t denotes the fiscal year.
Each variable represents the value at the beginning of the fiscal year.
Demand for banknotes and required reserves
The BoJ supplies required reserves and banknotes passively in response to the demands for bank deposits and cash from the public. We assume banknote demand depends on nominal GDP and the nominal interest rates:
where GDP t denotes annual nominal GDP, and µ t is the banknotes-to-GDP ratio. We also assume a regime shift in µ t to capture the interest-rate elasticity of banknote demand:
where τ denotes the fiscal year when the BoJ achieves the inflation target. As assumed below, the BoJ raises the policy rate after this year. This simple specification of the interest rate elasticity is sufficient for our simulations, as our scenario analysis does not consider detailed business-cycle fluctuations in the nominal GDP growth rate and the nominal interest rate after t hits τ .
Reserve balances held by financial institutions are split into required reserves (D REQ,t ) and excess reserves (D EX,t ):
The demand for required reserves is proportional to bank-deposit demand by the public:
where γ is the average reserve requirement ratio and η t is the bank deposits-to-GDP ratio.
For a similar reason to (2), there is a regime shift in η t when t hits τ :
Supply of excess reserves
The BoJ's flow of funds constraint determines the supply of excess reserves, given the BoJ's asset purchase policy on JGBs and net short-term assets. The BoJ's flow of funds constraint is written as
where V t is the purchase value of newly purchased JGBs, R t is the coupon payments on JGBs, P t is the redemption of JGBs held by the BoJ at maturity, i ST,t is the short-term nominal interest rate, X t is the interest expense on reserves, J t is the payment of after-tax profit to the government, F t is the general and administrative expenses and costs, such as personnel expenses, and T t is the corporate and residential taxes incurred by the BoJ. Note that on the right-hand side of (6), the BoJ's expenditures have a positive sign while the revenues have a negative sign. This is because the increment in reserve balances on the left-hand side of (6) is the BoJ's cash flow, but with the opposite sign. The new issue of banknotes, C t+1 − C t , appears as the last term on the right-hand side of (6) Reflecting the three-tier system, the interest expense on reserves, X t , is determined by the following rule:
where i CB,t is the central-bank interest rate on Policy-Rate Reserves before the end of QQE and on excess reserves after the end of QQE. We assume that the short-term interest rate is anchored by this interest rate:
We simply assume that the general and administrative expenses and costs grow at the same rate as GDP:
Accounting profit and net assets
The BoJ transfers a fraction of its accounting profit to the government. The BoJ's pretax accounting profit, π t , is defined as
where A t is the amortization of the discount on JGBs under the amortized cost method.
Accordingly, the book value of JGBs, B t , is updated through this method:
For simplicity, we assume that the corporate and residential taxes incurred by the BoJ are proportional to positive pretax profit:
Under the current rule, the BoJ pays out a fraction of its after-tax annual accounting profit to the government the following year, and retains the remainder as part of its net assets.
Thus, the payment of profit to the government, J t , is determined by the following rule:
where θ is the proportion of after-tax accounting profit to be transferred to the government. Here, we assume that the BoJ does not make any transfer if it incurs an accounting loss for the year. 5 The BoJ has adopted this method since 2004, under which the difference between the face value and purchase value of JGBs held to maturity is evenly split over maturity to compute the amortization of the discount for each year. The amortized discount is then gradually recognized as part of interest revenues each year and added to the book value of JGBs, so that the book value equals the face value at maturity. 6 Precisely speaking, the BoJ's remittance of profit to the government is accounted for as part of ordinary expenses when calculating the BoJ's pretax accounting profit. At the same time, the remittance is set to equal a certain percent of the BoJ's after-tax accounting profit. For simplicity, we ignore this practice to avoid the iteration, because the resulting adjustment is small. The BoJ's net assets are simply the difference between the book value of its assets and its liabilities:
Overall, (3)- (13) determine the transition of the BoJ's balance sheet and accounting profit, given the characteristics of the JGBs held by the BoJ (R t and P t ), the BoJ's asset purchase policy (V t and S t+1 −S t ), macroeconomic variables (i ST,t and GDP t ), and the timing of the achievement of the inflation target, which ends QQE (τ ).
Simulation setup
Hereafter, we simulate the model by inserting data, including the current BoJ's asset purchase policy, under simple macroeconomic scenarios. This exercise aims to identify important factors that determine the cost to exit QQE. The starting month of the simulations is June 2016.
Timing of the end of QQE
Currently, the BoJ is committed to achieving the inflation target in fiscal year 2017. Accordingly, we set τ to 2017 for a benchmark. This assumption implies that the BoJ achieves the inflation target at the end of fiscal year 2017 (or March 2018) in the model, given the annual frequency of the model.
BoJ's asset purchase policy before the end of QQE
In October 2014, the BoJ announced an expansion of QQE, which aims to increase the reserve balances held by financial institutions by 80 trillion yen per year until it achieves the inflation target. Thus, we assume 
For simplicity, we assume that the terms of JGB purchases for each maturity, such as the price and the coupon rate, are the same as in the primary market at the end of May 2016.
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Under this assumption, the average maturity of newly purchased JGBs is around nine years, which is consistent with the BoJ's policy as of June 2016 that sets the average remaining maturity of newly purchased JGBs to between seven and twelve years.
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Given the JGB purchase policy set by (15) , the BoJ adjusts its net short-term assets to increase the reserve balances held by financial institutions by 80 trillion yen per year. Thus, (6) implies that
where D t+1 − D t and V t are set by (14) and (15), respectively.
BoJ's asset purchase policy after the end of QQE
We assume that after the end of QQE, the BoJ holds JGBs until maturity and does not make any new purchases:
Following the BoJ's policy in regular time, we also assume that the BoJ purchases T-bills, part of net short-term assets in the model, using the revenues from any redeemed JGBs for one year. 9 After that, the BoJ receives reserve balances from the government for the repayment of T-bills. Thus, reserve balances at the end of fiscal year, D t+1 , decline through (6) as JGBs held by the BoJ gradually mature.
In addition, the BoJ's balance of net short-term assets at the end of QQE is higher than the value of redeemed JGBs in the previous year in the simulations. We assume that the BoJ maintains this excess balance of net short-term assets after the end of QQE, because otherwise the balance of net short-term assets becomes unrealistically close to zero as JGBs held by the BoJ mature over time.
If reserve balances become insufficient for required reserves, then the BoJ supplies the necessary amount of reserve balances by adjusting its net short-term assets. Overall, the BoJ's adjustment of net short-term assets is specified as
where the right-hand side of the second line is derived by substituting D t+1 = D REQ,t+1 into (6).
Data on BoJ's JGB holdings and balance sheet
The coupon payments (R t ) and redemption (P t ) of JGBs depend on the terms of past asset purchases by the BoJ. The BoJ publishes the face value of its JGBs for each issuance date. We combine these data with the coupon rate and the maturity for each issuance date published by the Ministry of Finance. The BoJ, however, does not publish the book value of its JGBs for each issuance date, but only the aggregate book value for each maturity. To compute the book value for each issuance date, we divide the aggregate book value for each maturity proportionally to the face value of each issuance date with that maturity.
For the initial value of the balance sheet items, we use the Bank of Japan Accounts as of the end of May 2016.
Benchmark scenario on the path of the inflation rate, the short-term interest rate, and the nominal GDP growth rate
For a benchmark, we assume that the annual inflation rate remains at 0% until the BoJ hits the inflation target (i.e., t ≤ τ ) and stays at the targeted rate, 2%, after the achievement of the target (i.e., t > τ ). The short-term interest rate, i ST,t , is set to −0.1% for t ≤ τ , which is the same as the current interest rate on Policy-Rate Balances. Then it is assumed to rise to 1.25% at t = T + 1 and 2.75% for t ≥ T + 2. The long-run short-term interest rate, 2.75%, is based on the observation that the spread between the geometric averages of the overnight call rate and the CPI inflation rate over 1990-2012 was 0.8%. Here we use sample averages during the Lost Decades before the beginning of QQE in 2013. We assume that the BoJ takes two years to raise the short-term interest rate to its long-run level after the end of QQE, as the policy interest rate is usually adjusted gradually in practice. The nominal GDP growth rate is set to the inflation rate plus 0.3%, which is the spread between the geometric averages of the two rates over 1990-2012.
Even though this simple scenario ignores feedback from the BoJ's balance sheet to aggregate economic activity, it allows us to run simulations under a transparent assumption. In this paper, we choose the benefit of considering a simple scenario based on past data, given the difficulty in precisely forecasting the long-term trend of GDP and other macroeconomic variables. Also, we do not use survey forecasts or financial market data, such as the yield curve, to set the time path of the interest rate, because these data reflect the average expectations over different contingencies, including the case in which the BoJ cannot achieve the inflation target within the announced deadline. In the benchmark scenario, we use the inflation rate as the anchor for the interest rate and nominal GDP by fixing the spread between each of the two variables and the inflation rate. Thus, the interest rate and nominal GDP move parallel to the inflation rate as the inflation target is achieved in this scenario.
Calibration of the remaining parameters
For banknote demand before the achievement of the inflation target, we setμ = 0.178, which is the banknotes-to-GDP ratio in 2014. Here, we use the latest year for which the Annual Report on National Accounts is available, because if we use a sample average in some post-war period, the difference between the last data point and the sample average must be absorbed by an artificial jump in the BoJ's net assets. For the period after the achievement of the inflation target, we set µ = 0.0797. This value is the sample average of the banknotesto-GDP ratio over the 1990s, which is the most recent period before quantitative easing in Japan in the 2000s.
We set a similar assumption for the demand for required reserves. The bank deposits-to-GDP ratios before and after the achievement of the inflation target (i.e.,η and η) are set to 2.08 and 1.53, respectively. These values are derived from the same sample periods as those used to setμ and µ. We set γ = 0.00593, which is the average reserve requirement ratio between 1992 and 2014, as there was a regulatory change in reserve requirement ratios in October 1991. 10 The ratio between the general and administrative expenses and costs and GDP, ϕ, is set to 0.000395, which makes F t equal 193 billion yen in 2014, as observed in the data. The corporate income and residential tax rate on the BoJ's pretax profit, κ, is set to 0.275, which is the average rate over the fiscal years between 2012 and 2014. We use only the data during these three years, as the corporate income tax rate changed in 2012. Finally, the proportion of the BoJ's after-tax accounting profit to be transferred to the government, θ, is set to 0.95, following the Bank of Japan Act.
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Benchmark results
In this section, we summarize the result of the benchmark simulation. These losses arise because of maturity transformation on the BoJ's balance sheet. As 10 The reserve requirement ratio differs across different categories of bank deposits. To set the value of γ, we compute the ratio between the sum of required reserves and the balance of bank deposits subject to reserve requirements for each fiscal year, and then take the sample average over 1992-2014.
11 Under this act, the five percent of after-tax accounting profit must be added to the BoJ's legal reserve each year.
the low yields on JGBs acquired during QQE are predetermined, the interest expenses on excess reserves surpass the interest revenues from JGBs as the BoJ raises the interest rate on excess reserves to increase the short-term interest rate after QQE. These losses continue until reserve balances sufficiently decline with the gradual redemption of JGBs.
The fiscal cost of QQE for the consolidated government appears in the BoJ's accounting loss. Note that if there were no QQE, the public would hold JGBs purchased by the BoJ, instead of the massive amount of reserve balances supplied to their banks. In this case, the consolidated government would pay interest on JGBs to the public, rather than that on excess reserves. Thus, the difference between interest on JGBs held by the BoJ and that on excess reserves paid by the BoJ to banks corresponds to increased interest expenses made by the consolidated government to the public. A caveat is that this loss is the gross fiscal cost under a given path of the short-term interest rate. To measure the opportunity cost of QQE, we need to know the precise path of the macroeconomic variables in the instance of no QQE. we compute the BoJ's net worth, which takes into account the present discounted value of future pretax profit. 12 We use the short-term interest rate for the discount rate, as the BoJ's assets consist of net short-term assets in the long run. We find that the time path of the BoJ's net worth is always positive, about 183 trillion yen in 2018, and steadily increases afterwards as nominal GDP grows, as shown in Figure 6 . Thus, the present discounted value 12 The BoJ's tax payments to the government are equivalent to the dividend payouts by a private company to its shareholders. Thus, we include pretax profit in the computation of the BoJ's net worth.
of future profit is sufficiently large to absorb the cumulative accounting losses after the end of QQE.
Sensitivity analysis
In this section, we discuss the sensitivity of the simulation result to alternative scenarios concerning the BoJ's behavior and the macroeconomic environment. Figure 7 shows the BoJ's balance sheet when QQE lasts until fiscal year 2019 (i.e., τ = 2019).
Longer duration of QQE
In this case, the BoJ's JGB holdings reach 550 trillion yen at their peak to achieve the large amount of annual reserve supply targeted under QQE. As a result, the BoJ's accounting losses after the end of QQE increase because of the larger amount of maturity transformation on the BoJ's balance sheet, as indicated by Figure 8 . Thus, the fiscal cost after the exit from QQE should be taken into account when the BoJ compares the cost and benefit of extending the duration of QQE.
Interest-rate elasticity of banknote demand
In the benchmark scenario, we assume that the banknotes-to-GDP ratio falls to its 1990s level as the short-term interest rate is normalized after the achievement of the inflation target. This assumption is important for the BoJ's accounting profit after the end of QQE, because the BoJ's profit in normal times stems from purchasing interest-bearing assets to supply banknotes to the public via banks. The supply of reserve balances is small relative to banknotes in normal times.
We consider three alternative scenarios for the interest-rate elasticity of banknote demand. In the first scenario, the banknotes-to-GDP ratio remains the same before and after the end of QQE (i.e.,μ = µ = 0.178). Thus, in this scenario, banknote demand does not respond to an increase in the short-term interest rate. Iwata et al. (2014) set this assumption for their simulation of the BoJ's balance sheet.
The second scenario uses the statistical estimation of the real banknote demand function.
We consider two specifications:
where RC t is real banknote demand, RGDP t is real GDP, and CALL t is the nominal overnight call rate. Using annual data between 1959 and 2013 for Japan, we find that the sec- The third scenario uses an estimate of the cash stash held as part of household savings.
The BoJ issues banknotes in denominations of one, two, five and 10 thousand yen, of which the one and 10 thousand yen notes are most commonly used. Otani and Suzuki (2008) assume that people only use 10 thousand yen notes when they hoard cash for savings, and that the transaction demands for one and 10 thousand yen notes are proportional to each other. Under these assumptions, Otani and Suzuki estimate the cash stash using the excess balance of 10 thousand yen notes above the transaction demand for these notes, which is assumed to grow at the same rate as the outstanding balance of one thousand yen notes.
14 They set 1995 as the base year in which they assume there is no cash stash in Japan.
Using Otani and Suzuki's method, we estimate the cash stash to be about 35 trillion yen (see Figure 9 ). For the third scenario, we assume that only the cash stash disappears as the BoJ raises the short-term interest rate, while the transaction demand for banknotes remains unaffected. This assumption implies that the banknotes-to-GDP ratio drops to 0.104 at the time of the end of QQE (i.e., µ = 0.104).
16 Figure 10 shows the BoJ's net assets under the benchmark and the three alternative scenarios. The figure demonstrates that the interest-rate elasticity of banknote demand is a crucial determinant of the BoJ's accounting losses and the duration in which the BoJ records negative net assets.
Building a loss-absorbing capital buffer before the end of QQE
Goodfriend (2014) Given these recent developments, Figure 11 shows the change in the BoJ's net assets when the BoJ retains all the after-tax profit to increase its net assets from the first month of the simulation, June 2016, until the end of QQE. The figure indicates that the accumulation of retained earnings before the end of QQE does not absorb much the cumulative losses after the end of QQE, because the BoJ is assumed to achieve the inflation target relatively soon in the simulation. Also, the term spread before the end of QQE reflects uncertainty on the BoJ's balance sheet as we do in this paper. 15 The so-called Jyu-sen problem occurred in Japan in 1995. Jyu-sen is the abbreviation of a nonbank mortgage loan lender. Japanese banks made real estate loans through Jyu-sens in the late 1980s, and the losses to Jyu-sens came to the surface in 1995. Thus, Otani and Suzuki (2008) measure the cash stash associated with the Japanese public's concerns with the financial health of Japanese banks. 16 This ratio is computed in such a way that if the banknotes-to-GDP ratio drops to this ratio in 2014, only the estimated cash stash for this year, 36.04 trillion yen, disappears from banknote demand. achievement of the inflation target. Because the time path shown in the simulation is one of possible events ex-ante, it is natural to observe that the term spread before the end of QQE is not high enough to reflect the expected gains from reserve holdings after an increase in the short-term interest rate at the end of QQE.
Tapering after the exit from QQE
In the benchmark simulation, we assume that the BoJ rolls over its JGB holdings for only one year by purchasing T-bills with the revenues from redeemed JGBs. For an alternative scenario, we consider the case in which the BoJ decreases its new purchases of JGBs gradually over a certain period of years after the end of QQE. In this case, the amount of newly purchased JGBs each year is set to decline linearly so that it becomes zero after the adjustment period. The average maturity of newly purchased JGBs after the end of QQE is assumed to be 10 years.
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In this case, we need to set a time path for the long-term nominal interest rate to compute the yield on JGBs purchased after the end of QQE. Following Krishnamurthy and VissingJorgensen (2011), we assume the existence of a safety channel such that
where i LT,t denotes the long-term nominal interest rate. On the right-hand side, 0.01 is the long-run term spread, 0.003 is the term spread under QQE before the introduction of a negative policy interest rate in February 2016, -0.0031 is the supply elasticity of the longterm interest rate implied by Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen's (2011) estimate of the safety channel in the US, and 0.041 is the ratio of the book value of JGBs held by the BoJ to nominal GDP in December 2014. The value of the long-run term spread equals the spread 17 More precisely, we assume that the outstanding balance of newly purchased JGBs follows a simple process such that
where N B t is the outstanding principal of JGBs purchased after the end of QQE at the beginning of fiscal year t and V t is the amount of newly purchased JGBs in fiscal year t.
between the geometric averages of the 10-year JGB yield and the overnight call rate over 1990-2012, which is the Lost Decades before the onset of QQE. The value of the term spread under QQE is based on the fact that the 10-year JGB yield fluctuated around 0.3-0.5% after the expansion of JGB purchases in December 2014 and until the introduction of a negative policy interest rate in February 2016, while the overnight call rate was set to 0.1% by the BoJ through the interest rate on excess reserves during that period. 18 For the supply elasticity of the long-term interest rate, we use Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen's US estimate, as we do not know of comparable analysis using Japanese data.
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Under (21), the long-term interest rate gradually increases to the long-run level after the BoJ's JGB holdings-to-GDP ratio becomes smaller than the level before December 2014.
We set this assumption because the long-term interest rate did not show a downward trend in 2015, despite continuing large-scale JGB purchases each month (see Figure 12 ). For simplicity, we set no coupon on JGBs purchased after the end of QQE, and also assume that the average yield on these JGBs equals the long-term nominal interest rate, i LT,t . Figure 13 shows the BoJ's balance sheet when the adjustment period for the BoJ's JGB purchases after the end of QQE is set at 10 years. Because of the continuation of new purchases of JGBs, the BoJ's JGB holdings peak in around 2020. Figure 14 compares the BoJ's net assets between the benchmark and alternative scenarios with adjustment periods of 10 and 20 years. As shown, tapering reduces the BoJ's accounting losses and the size of negative net assets. This is because the BoJ can profit from the term spread after the end of QQE, as shown in Figure 15 .
The safety channel plays an important role in determining the effect of tapering. Figure 16 compares the BoJ's net assets with and without the safety channel, given that the adjustment period for the BoJ's JGB purchases is set at 10 years. In the case of no safety channel, the term spread immediately jumps to the long-run level (i.e., i LT,t = i ST,t + 0.01) after the end of QQE. The figure demonstrates that if the term spread returns to its pre-QQE level immediately after the end of QQE, then the BoJ will earn significant profit from the term spread through continuing purchases of JGBs. As a result, the BoJ will narrowly avoid negative net assets. Thus, tapering saves more fiscal cost for the consolidated government as the safety channel is less significant. A caveat is that the term spread is assumed to be always positive after the end of QQE in the simulation. A longer duration of tapering increases the risk of losses to the consolidated government due to negative term spreads, which can occur from time to time over the business cycle.
Conclusions
We have simulated the BoJ's cash flows and balance sheet before and after the end of QQE under various scenarios. The simulations show that the BoJ will record significant accounting losses after the end of QQE. These losses are fiscal costs for the consolidated government, as they correspond to increased interest expenses to the public due to the replacement of JGBs with reserve balances under QQE. We have also found that a longer duration of QQE and a higher interest-rate elasticity of banknote demand increase the BoJ's accounting losses significantly. Thus, the BoJ should take into account the fiscal cost when deciding the duration of the large-scale purchase of JGBs under QQE, and also should not take the current banknote demand for granted.
The cumulative accounting losses make the BoJ's net assets negative over 100 years in the simulations. While this is a ballpark estimate given simple macroeconomic scenarios to run simulations under transparent assumptions, it still demonstrates that it is a realistic possibility that the BoJ will report negative net assets for a sustained period of time after The policy announced for June 2016 is as shown in Table 2 . The monthly purchase value for each maturity of JGBs in the model, i.e., the figure in Table 1 , equals the median value of the following range in Table 2 : two-and five-year bonds fall into the second row; ten-year bonds fall into the third row; and twenty-year bonds fall into the fourth row. For two-and five-year bonds, we split into half the median value of the range shown in the second row of Table 2 . The figures in Table 1 imply that the average maturity of newly purchased JGBs before the exit from QQE is 9.1 years. This figure satisfies the BoJ's actual policy on the average remaining maturity of purchased JGBs, which is set between seven and twelve years as of June 2016.
B Estimation of the real banknote demand function
In the literature, Nakashima and Saito (2012) and Miyao (2002 Miyao ( , 2005 analyze the interest rate elasticity of M1 (the sum of banknotes and demand deposits) in Japan by specifying real M1 as the dependent variable in (19) and (20) For the estimation of (19) and (20), we use the following data for 1959-2013:
• C t : the annual average balance of banknotes for each fiscal year.
• N GDP t : GDP deflator for each fiscal year; 1993SNA data for 1993-2013 extended with the annual growth rates in 1968SNA data for 1959-1992.
• Call t : the annual average overnight call rate; the collateralized rate until 1984 and the uncollateralized rate from 1985.
In the sample period, 2013 is the most recent year in which data on GDP in the Annual Report on National Accounts is available, and 1959 is the first year in which the call rate data exist. We define the real balance of banknotes and the real GDP by
respectively.
We first conduct an augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and find that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of a unit root with a time trend, except for CALL t (see Table 3 ). For Next, we conduct the Engel-Granger test and find that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration among the variables appearing in each of (19) and (20) (see Table   4 ).
Given this result, we test a structural break in cointegration using Gregory and Hansen's (1996) test. In this test, the null hypothesis is no cointegration, and the alternative hypothesis is cointegration with a structural break. While we cannot reject the null hypothesis for (19), we find that there is a structural break in 2004 according to the ADF and Z t statistics (see Table 5 ).
Given a cointegration relationship for (20) over the period 1959-2003, we estimate the cointegration coefficients using SOLS and DOLS, following Hayashi (2000) (see Table 6 ).
The estimation result for DOLS does not change significantly, even if we set the number of lags to one year. Sources: The Bank of Japan and the authors' calculation. Note: "Transaction demand for 10000 yen notes" is the hypothetical balance of 10,000 yen notes that grows at the same rate as 1,000 yen notes in circulation from 1995. With the safety channel Without the safety channel Note: For both cases, the amount of new purchases of JGBs each year after the end of QQE is linearly reduced so that it becomes zero 10 years after the end of QQE.
